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The Limitations of Economic Reasoning in
Analyzing Duress
Shawn Bayern†
My colleagues and friends, Mark Seidenfeld and Murat
Mungan, have made an interesting attempt to reduce the doctrine of duress in contract law to an inquiry about “rentseeking,” by which they mean attempts to redistribute rather
than to produce wealth.1 There is much truth in their argument, and they are admirably sensitive to many factors that
should be, and are, important in contract-modification cases. I
do not think they have shown, however, that duress can workably be reduced to a simple formulation in the way they intend—or that even if it could, it would serve the functional or
even simply the instrumental goals of contract law to do so.2
DURESS AS RENT SEEKING
Seidenfeld and Mungan’s argument is clear: in judging
whether a party’s threat is “wrongful” or “improper” for the
purposes of determining whether it constitutes duress,3
courts—if they intend to maximize social wealth—should decide whether (1) the threatened conduct serves the interests of
that party or (2) the threatened conduct is instead motivated
only to extract value from the other party. Because a wealthmaximizing legal regime would encourage productivity but discourage investment in redistribution alone, threats of the first
type are legitimate, whereas threats of the second type are not.
† Larry & Joyce Beltz Professor, Florida State University College of
Law. Copyright © 2015 by Shawn Bayern.
1. Mark Seidenfeld & Murat C. Mungan, Duress as Rent Seeking, 99
MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (draft on file with author).
2. To be clear, I do not think that the law is or should be motivated only
by propositions of efficiency; other concerns, such as morality and policies other than efficiency, can and should be significant. My goal in this essay, however, is to critique an argument that rests on grounds of efficiency merely by
showing that it would not achieve its goals. For that limited purpose, the rest
of this essay speaks largely in consequentialist terms that seek to promote allocative efficiency, accept the general efficiency of markets, and so on.
3. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 (1981).
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Accordingly, for example, I might decide to plant several trees
in my front yard because I enjoy trees, and I might inform my
neighbor that I plan to do so even though I know that my
neighbor would prefer that I not; if the neighbor subsequently
offers me something of value to induce me not to plant the
trees, we would have a legitimate, enforceable contract or exchange.4 By contrast, if planting trees gives me no value, but I
still give my neighbor the opportunity to induce me not to do so,
my doing so is improper and constitutes duress—and any contract resulting from a threat to plant trees would therefore be
unenforceable. I will call this determination of duress—
Seidenfeld and Mungan’s chief proposition—the Rent-Seeking
Test.
The Rent-Seeking Test captures something important,
which is that an element of good faith in contracting and business generally is for parties not to act in ways that do not benefit them except to the extent that the activities extract value
from others. Accordingly, for example, in the famous case of
Page v. Page,5 Justice Traynor permitted the dissolution of a
partnership at will but noted that, “like any other power held
by a fiduciary,” the decision to dissolve a partnership “must be
exercised in good faith.”6 Good faith in business law means
many things,7 but one way to conceive Justice Traynor’s requirement of good faith in Page is that while partners at will
may ordinarily dissolve a partnership for any reason, they cannot time or otherwise orchestrate a dissolution to extract more
value from their partners than they were otherwise able to negotiate in the partnership agreement. Thus, Justice Traynor
wrote:
A partner may not . . . by use of adverse pressure “freeze
out” a co-partner and appropriate the business to his own use.
A partner may not dissolve a partnership to gain the benefits of
the business for himself, unless he fully compensates his copartner for his share of the prospective business opportunity.8
The Rent-Seeking Test is broadly consistent with this for4. Seidenfeld & Mungan, supra note 1, at 13–20.
5. 359 P.2d 41, 44 (Cal. 1961) (citation omitted) (“Even though the Uniform Partnership Act provides that a partnership at will may be dissolved by
the express will of any partner, this power, like any other power held by a fiduciary, must be exercised in good faith.”).
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith in Corporate
Law, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2006) (outlining multiple meanings of good faith in
corporate law).
8. Page, 359 P.2d at 44.
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mulation of good faith. Under the Rent-Seeking Test, a partner
can dissolve a partnership so long as he benefits from doing so
in a way other than his “freezing out” of a copartner.
Moreover, Seidenfeld and Mungan very nicely apply their
argument to several significant cases. For example, I largely—
though not completely—agree with their treatment of the difficult contract-modification case of Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Corp.,9 which I discuss in Part II.C infra.
DURESS AS BOTH MORE AND LESS THAN RENT
SEEKING
The Rent-Seeking Test, however, is not a principled, consistent, or desirable basis for a general law of duress in contract
or restitution cases.10 There are four essential problems with
Seidenfeld and Mungan’s argument: (1) the lack of administrability of the Rent-Seeking Test; (2) the promotion of short-run
static efficiency at the expense of longer-run dynamic efficiency
associated with the assignment of legal entitlements; (3) in contract-modification cases, insufficient attention to the scope of
the prior agreement and to the relevance of changed circumstances, and (4) an explicit exception for rent-seeking behavior
in contract negotiations that undermines the basis of the RentSeeking Test they propose because it rests on an inconsistent
distinction between cases in which contracts should be invalidated and those in which they should be upheld. This section
considers these problems in turn.
THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF IMPLEMENTING THE RENTSEEKING TEST
To begin to critique Seidenfeld and Mungan’s essay, it is
9. 272 N.E.2d 533 (N.Y. 1971).
10. It is important to recognize that the function and importance of duress
is not limited to contract law. Thus, while duress might be a defense to the
enforcement of a breach-of-contract claim, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 175 (1981), it might also constitute the basis of a cause of action
for restitution as a way to reverse a legally executed transfer. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 14 (2011) (“A
transfer induced by duress is subject to rescission and restitution.”). Indeed,
in Austin v. Loral itself, duress arises as the basis of a restitutionary cause of
action to restore prior payments from the threatened party to the threatening
party. See Austin, 272 N.E.2d at 533 (“The defendant, Loral Corporation,
seeks to recover payment for goods delivered under a contract which it had
with the plaintiff Austin Instrument, Inc., on the ground that the evidence establishes, as a matter of law, that it was forced to agree to an increase in price
on the items in question under circumstances amounting to economic duress.”).
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important to recognize a simple feature of the legal landscape:
economic duress is not widespread. Their essay suggests an extremely general principle that would invalidate many contracts
that would today unproblematically be upheld, but the principle is so broad that it could never appropriately be applied.
There are a handful of specific circumstances in which courts
will treat a threat to exercise a legal right as sufficient to constitute economic duress; the most important of these cases involve modifications to contracts, which I discuss infra in Part
II.C. The other circumstances are relatively minor, and under
modern law they are essentially treated as special cases; for
example, it may be “legal” to file a lawsuit, but the threat to do
so is improper if the lawsuit is known to be meritless.11 The
wrongful threat of meritless civil litigation, however, is not a
significant example of the general use of legal right to amount
to wrongful threats; in fact, it is something of an aberration,
perhaps resulting from a reluctance to treat borderline litigation as criminal or tortious.12
In any event, Seidenfeld and Mungan’s suggestion that the
cases are confused in their treatment of threats in general13
may overstate the matter. As a descriptive matter, outside the
contract-modification context and the other special cases, the
cases do not appear to be confused in the way they claim; they
simply do not consider there to be a problem. While there may
be some cases in which contracts that the law currently upholds should probably be invalidated—like the cases of “distress” that I discuss later in Part II.B, infra—Seidenfeld and
11. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST EN§ 14 cmt. h. (“The threat or instigation of legal proceedings in pursuit of a claim known to be unjustified is wrongful prima facie; such acts constitute duress, and a transfer induced thereby is voidable.”).
12. Indeed, the case of threats of civil litigation presents a useful counterexample to the application of the Rent-Seeking Test. Suppose A has a legitimate legal claim against B that A nonetheless knows is not worth pursuing,
economically speaking, because A’s costs of litigation would exceed the (legitimate) proceeds from a judgment. The Rent-Seeking Test would consider it duress, and thus invalidate a contract or exchange, for A to threaten litigation in
that case. That would be a startling result, because it would undermine A’s
ability to assert a legitimate legal claim against B; A would run the risk of duress for seeking to settle the claim by informing B that he is considering legitimate litigation. As the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichmen t§ 14 cmt. h. nicely puts it: “Subject to limited exceptions, a goodfaith threat of legal process, though evidently coercive, must be permissible; so
that a transfer induced thereby is not subject to rescission for duress.” Id.
13. Seidenfeld & Mungan, supra note 1, at 15 (“Unfortunately, courts
have not explained what distinguishes those threats that are wrongful from
those that are not.”).
RICHMENT
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Mungan propose too general a response to a problem that the
courts have not recognized.
So, for example, consider my initial example involving a
decision to plant trees in my front yard that my neighbor
doesn’t want. The law, very clearly, will not inquire as to
whether I have decided to plant these trees just to extract value
from my neighbor. Imagine if it did. A contract with my
neighbor not to plant the trees would then be subject to a subjective, individualized inquiry into my valuation of trees, and
courts are very poorly equipped to conduct such an inquiry. It
is important to recognize, despite substantial commentary to
the contrary, that modern courts are in fact well-equipped to
make many subjective, individualized inquiries—and that they
routinely exercise this ability.14 The particular inquiries that
the Rent-Seeking Test calls for, however, are alien in our judicial system because they depend on largely unverifiable propositions of personal value. For example, to determine whether to
enforce the contract in the case of the forgone trees, a court
would need to determine whether I would derive any value
from those trees. Is it even plausible that there would be a case
where I could not establish the possibility of that subjective
value—enough to avoid invalidating the contract under the
Rent-Seeking Test? If not, then the case simply shouldn’t be
subject to a doctrine of economic duress—and that is precisely
the result under the law. The Rent-Seeking Test requires an
analysis that is simply unavailable in the real world—
specifically, a reliable mechanism to determine parties’ valuations of everything without any mechanism for the production
of information about such valuations.15
14. See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Emergence of Dynamic Contract
Law, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1743, 1749 (2000) (“[C]lassical contract law doctrines
lay almost wholly at the objective, standardized, and static poles . . . . In contrast, modern contract law . . . pervasively (although not completely) consists
of principles that are individualized, dynamic, multi-faceted, and, in appropriate cases, subjective.”). As an example, modern courts, even in relatively formalist common-law jurisdictions, have had no problem measuring subjective
values for the purpose of setting contract damages. See, e.g., Ruxley Elecs. &
Constr. Ltd. v. Forsyth, 3 All E.R. 268, 273 (1996) (valuing a homeowner’s subjective loss in the enjoyment of a swimming pool with a small defect at
£2,500).
15. The computation of subjective valuation in Ruxley, id., is narrower,
more purposeful, and more tied to plausible valuation. Faced with a real harm
that is impossible to measure objectively, the court decided to compute the
value subjectively instead of denying damages altogether; it computed these
damages based on common sense and probably with reference to the contract
price. That is a sound result that American courts should follow more than
they have done. But it is very different from subjecting every contract to a de-

146

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 99:141

It is important to recognize that Seidenfeld and Mungan do
not claim that their test is administrable or offer an affirmative
argument in favor of its workability, so this part of my response
does not in fact critique the internal logic of their argument. It
may be that they are simply concerned with elucidating an economic effect in theory. That is fine in theory, but if the question is whether a particular test for duress (like the RentSeeking Test) should influence courts’ decisions of cases, the
administrability of the test is a necessary component of the answer. Regardless of other criteria that a proposed rule meets, if
it fails the criterion of administrability then it cannot be adopted as a rule of law. As Mel Eisenberg and I have put it in a recent critique of challenges to the expectation measure in contract law:
In law-and-economics—as opposed to straightforward microeconomics—the formal validity of a model is only a first test.
Other tests are whether the legal regime suggested by a model
is administrable, whether the model takes institutional considerations into account, and whether implementation of the model would involve more costs than benefits.16
There is a deeper problem, too, associated with any attempt to implement the Rent-Seeking Test; it is roughly the
problem that Robert Nozick identified in discussing “utility
monsters,” or those whom utilitarians might be committed to
favoring merely because of their strong preferences.17 The key
determination under Seidenfeld and Mungan’s Rent-Seeking
Test is whether a party had a reason to make a threat other
than extracting value from another party, but such reasons
may be backed—at least for the sort of consequentialists that
Seidenfeld and Mungan claim to be—by any sort of phenomenological value. For example, suppose the property owner in the
case of the forgone trees derives value from (that is, incorporates into his utility function) the suffering of his neighbor, or
values spite, or is characterized by the enjoyment of injustice
that ancient Greek philosophers called pleonexia.18 In all those
termination of whether every party’s “threats” concerning its legal entitlements would in fact enhance or destroy value for that party.
16. Shawn J. Bayern & Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Expectation Measure
and Its Discontents, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 37 (2013); see also Melvin A. Eisenberg & Brett H. McDonnell, Expectation Damages and the Theory of Overreliance, 54 Hastings L.J. 1335, 1135–36 (2003) (critiquing an economic argument concerning contract damages in view of “institutional considerations”).
17. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 41 (1974).
18. Cf. Shawn J. Bayern, The Significance of Private Burdens and Lost
Benefits for a Fair-Play Analysis of Punishment, 12 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 1, 23 &
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cases, the property owner derives value from the planting of
the trees and thus satisfies the Rent-Seeking Test. Moreover,
these cases complicate the workability of the test; not only do
we need to measure subjective valuation of trees, but we must
also be sensitive to all potential motivations the property owner
has for planting them.
Consider a more specific, complex example: E, an environmentalist, wishes to drive out of business D, a local drycleaning establishment that uses the very toxic perchloroethylene as its cleaning solving. As a result, E makes the following threat to D: “If you do not sell me your business by the end
of the week at the below-market rate of $50,000 so that I can
immediately shut it down, I will set up a much cheaper drycleaning establishment across the street. I won’t make any
money doing this, because the ‘green’ solvent is much more expensive than perchloroethylene, but I don’t care; my sole purpose will be to draw business from your store until you go out of
business.” Ignoring the potential federal antitrust implications
of a business’s seeking to shutter another through predatory
pricing,19 does E’s threat pass or fail the Rent-Seeking Test? If
D concedes to E’s threat, then on one hand E has extracted value from D by threatening to engage in unprofitable behavior;
on the other hand, E may enjoy driving an environmentally unfriendly operation out of business, or she simply may enjoy
running an economically unproductive dry-cleaning business.
Even if we could somehow avoid the conceptual difficulties that
these questions indicate for the Rent-Seeking Test, how would
we ever practically answer the question?
THE LONG-RUN EFFICIENCY OF PREALLOCATING
ENTITLEMENTS
The Rent-Seeking test faces problems other than its administrability. It is also unsound as an efficiency-promoting
test because it would undermine a system of entitlements (under, for example, property law) in favor of a short-run, static
criterion of efficiency—that is, whether a single transaction appears, based on an analysis with limited scope, to produce valn. 38 (2009) (discussing potential psychological benefits from injustice); Thomas Morawetz, Adam, Eve, and Emma: On Criminal Responsibility and Moral
Wisdom, 22 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 23, 28 (2003) (suggesting that criminals may
benefit merely from “even just the satisfaction of having broken a rule”).
19. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 117–18 (1986)
(“Predatory pricing may be defined as pricing below an appropriate measure of
cost for the purpose of eliminating competitors in the short run and reducing
competition in the long run. . . . [It is] capable of inflicting antitrust injury.”).
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ue. The efficiency of a legal rule cannot be decided by evaluating only static, short-run, context-free criteria.
The lack of an existing, sweeping economic-duress doctrine
in the case of the forgone trees suggests, if the law is broadly
efficient, simply that the law recognizes the longer-run efficiency of property law’s allocation of entitlements. I have purchased a right to plant the trees (and thus extract the value
that arises from doing so), and enforcing that right is easier
(and less expensive) than determining whether I value it subjectively. Legal economists have long recognized, in studying
the law and theory of property ownership, that legal property
regimes reduce transaction costs by making entitlements
clear.20 Seidenfeld and Mungan’s argument would muddy otherwise clear entitlements at very significant cost. Note that
every contract would be subject to their test; every contractual
offer is an implicit threat to do, or not to do, something, and the
Rent-Seeking Test would require that each offer be evaluated
for rent-seeking.21
There is, however, a class of case—which Professor Melvin
Eisenberg has called “distress” rather than “duress”22—that is
more problematic than the case of the forgone trees. Cases of
distress involve one party’s taking advantage of another’s adventitiously hard position.23 Ordinarily such cases involve
price gouging in some way.24 Seidenfeld and Mungan’s example involving water sold during a hurricane fits this pattern,25
as does Eisenberg’s example of a traveler stranded in the desert
who promises his rescuer $100,000 in exchange for a rescue.26
These cases are important, and they perhaps represent an area
where existing doctrine is wrong not to recognize a potential
defense to enforcement.
20. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 81–86 (3d
ed. 2000).
21. Existing efficient entitlements may also arise from statutes. For example, labor unions have the right to organize and to strike. But a pure application of the Rent-Seeking Test would perversely prevent all threats by a union to stop work and strike, because doing so would not produce more new
value than continuing work. Perhaps that result could be called efficient on
an extremely short-run view (in the simple sense that work is more productive
than work stoppages), but it would ignore the longer-run efficiencies that the
labor statutes offer in correcting a market failure.
22. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95
HARV. L. REV. 741, 754–63 (1982).
23. Id.
24. See id.
25. Seidenfeld & Mungan, supra note 1, at 16–18.
26. Eisenberg, supra note 22, at 755.
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Ironically, however, Seidenfeld and Mungan’s analysis gets
these cases exactly wrong, even from the perspective of efficiency. While they would complicate enforceability in the case of
the forgone trees, they would explicitly bless full enforcement of
price-gouging contracts made in cases of distress, because in
both these cases either the promisee benefits from nonperformance (rescue in the desert is costly) or the threat was simply
not to contract (as in the case of the hoarded water in a hurricane).27 In such cases, however, full enforcement is at best
problematic, even from the perspective of efficiency.28 In the
case of adventitious rescue, there is by hypothesis no investment that enforcing the contract can encourage. In both cases,
there is hardly a market to speak of; permitting enforcement
upholds transfers that are only barely voluntary exchanges, in
which—if the good at issue is truly a life-saving supply in an
emergency—one side is able to extract unlimited financial value from the other. At best, as in the case of adventitious rescue, there is a bilateral monopoly; at worst, as in the case of the
hurricane water, there is a unilateral monopoly. The incentives of contract enforcement on investment in these cases is
unlikely to be significant, if for no other reason than that if it
were significant, there would be a enough of a market to prevent monopoly pricing in the first place. It is no surprise, given
the failure of the market in such cases, that many states have
passed anti-price-gouging statutes that not only invalidate but
also penalize such transfers.29
To be clear, my argument is not that any extreme circumstances automatically lead to unconscionable price gouging that
should be prohibited. For example, it is no surprise that the
27. See, e.g., Seidenfeld & Mungan, supra note 1, at 17–18 (confirming
that their test will uphold a price-gouging contract). For the exception regarding threats not to contract, see infra Part II.D.
28. It is certainly problematic from other perspectives. See Eisenberg, supra note 22, at 756 (“In terms of fairness, our society posits, as part of its moral order, some degree of concern for others.”).
29. E.g., FLA. STAT. 501.160 (“Upon a declaration of a state of emergency
by the Governor, it is unlawful . . . for a person or her or his agent or employee
to rent or sell or offer to rent or sell at an unconscionable price within the area
for which the state of emergency is declared, any essential commodity including, but not limited to, supplies, services, provisions, or equipment that is necessary for consumption or use as a direct result of the emergency.”); N.Y. GEN.
BUS. LAW § 396-r (McKinney) (“During any abnormal disruption of the market
for consumer goods and services vital and necessary for the health, safety and
welfare of consumers, no party within the chain of distribution of such consumer goods or services or both shall sell or offer to sell any such goods or services or both for an amount which represents an unconscionably excessive
price.”).
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price of emergency supplies should rise in an emergency, and
the rise alone does not indicate a problem. As long as there is a
functioning market, market contracts should be enforced. But
rewarding the rescuer or the water stockpiler with a substantial windfall at the expense of those in a hard position is neither necessary to encourage productive investment nor backed
by the general arguments in favor of upholding voluntary exchanges.
To generalize somewhat, our difference on this point may
suggest a broader statement of the disagreement I have with
Seidenfeld and Mungan: their proposed test for duress is not
sensitive to many desirable criteria that courts have ordinarily
sought to evaluate when applying the doctrine of duress. Duress vitiates contracts because it undermines voluntariness; it
removes one of the principal moral and economic bases for enforcing contracts in the first place—namely, that voluntary exchange is ordinarily both fair and efficient and that precommitment is a useful mechanism for facilitating voluntary
exchange. This is why the doctrine of duress ordinarily requires not just that a threat be “improper” (what the RentSeeking Test aims to determine) but also of sufficient “gravity.”30 Though Seidenfeld and Mungan note that their focus is
only on the impropriety and not the other elements of duress,31
they routinely apply their test to invalidate contracts in situations where the threatened party is not under significant pressure. To the extent the Rent-Seeking Test disregards the gravity of threats, it would expand the doctrine of duress to cases in
which markets function properly—even while upholding enforcement in those cases where there was barely a market to
speak of.
In other words, the Rent-Seeking Test appears to prevent
good bargains that achieve value for voluntarily acting parties
who have no other way to achieve the same value. In the case
of the forgone trees, nobody doubts that I can in fact plant the
trees—or set up a precommitment mechanism that will necessarily cause the trees to be planted unless I enter into a contract with my neighbor. Given that, and given that the neighbor wants me not to do so, obtaining a promise from me to
avoid planting the trees may have significant value to the
neighbor. The neighbor is under very little pressure, however,
from my threat. He can calmly consider whether the best use of
30. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.18 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing
the “gravity” requirement).
31. Seidenfeld & Mungan, supra note 1, at 11.
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his money is to commit the $5000 to me or to some other purpose. An ordinary market is functioning. Sure, enforcing the
contract may cause me to invest in planting trees I don’t want
in order to make my threat credible to the neighbor, but what is
the alternative? Without the possibility of enforcing the contract, Seidenfeld and Mungan apparently hope to remove my
incentive to plant the trees in the first place. But this assumes
I am rational, that I am aware of and understand the law, and
so on. If I do in fact plant the trees (hoping to extract value in
ignorance of the Rent-Seeking Test), the Rent-Seeking Test
would deny my neighbor the opportunity for a voluntary contract to influence my behavior. Unless Seidenfeld and Mungan
are prepared to take away my legal right to plant the trees—in
which case their Rent-Seeking Test is irrelevant because I
would be threatening to commit a crime, which as they recognize is already prohibited apart from the Rent-Seeking Test32—
their rule denies a valuable possibility for my neighbor, unless
they further assume that every party is rational, fully aware of
the law, and so on.
As another example, consider a promisor under very little
pressure who agrees to a nonproductive “threat” partly for
broader contractual or reputational reasons. For example, take
again the case of the forgone trees and suppose the neighbor
agrees partly because he doesn’t want to have trees blocking
his view but also because, in the past, his property has caused a
minor nuisance to the planter of the trees and he thinks it’s only fair to redress the balance. (Or suppose the consideration for
the forgone trees is not money but a reasonable in-kind concession.) If this is the case, the neighbor is under essentially no
pressure, and the contract is voluntary. On what basis should
one who favors markets void such a contract?
There are two further general economic problems with the
Rent-Seeking Test. The first relates to a broad problem in legal-economic reasoning that I recently identified and discussed
in an article called False Efficiencies and Missed Opportunities
in Law and Economics.33 As I argued in that article, legaleconomic arguments often proceed by identifying an activity
that is more productive than its absence and then encouraging
the law to promote it on the basis that it is productive.34 Such
arguments are incomplete, however, because not all productive
32. Id. at 10–11.
33. Shawn J. Bayern, False Efficiency and Missed Opportunities in Law
and Economics, 86 TUL. L. REV. 135 (2011).
34. See generally id.
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activity can occur (given, for example, limits in the perfection of
capital markets, credit markets, factor markets, and so on); as
a result, promoting a “productive” activity might be specifically
inefficient when that activity is compared against other activities that are even more productive.35 The Rent-Seeking Test
suffers from this problem because it conditions a determination
of duress merely on whether a party’s threatened activity creates some value, versus none. But because not all potentially
productive activity can occur, creating some value is not a sufficient basis for even an economically motivated argument to distinguish favored from disfavored activity; there must be a
broader evaluation of the consequences of a rule. In short, a
grain of productivity does not necessarily justify massive investment motivated by redistribution.
Second—more concrete but related to the first problem—a
test that asks, more or less, “What would a party have done anyway even if not for the opportunity to extract surplus?”
threatens to encourage parties to become, over the long term,
like those who would “do things anyway.” Essentially, this concern is just one about courts’ ability to evaluate long-term, rather than short-term, courses of conduct for good-faith action,
but the concern is significant. As an analogy, in the rules of
baseball, a fielder may not physically interfere with a baserunner except in a (presumably good faith) attempt to field a
ball.36 In theory, a fielder with significant foresight could time
his supposedly good-faith “act of fielding the ball” in order to
interfere with a runner in a manner that would appear, in
short-run terms, to be unavoidable. The same is true of conduct under the Rent-Seeking Test. Unless courts are extremely
confident that they can chart a party’s motivations over very
long time periods, the test is subject to manipulation. For example, in the case of the forgone trees, even if it were possible
to determine a homeowner’s subjective valuation of trees, all a
homeowner needs to do to achieve an enforceable contract is to
develop a preference for trees. Importantly, the Rent-Seeking
Test not only fails to stop such behavior; it also affirmatively
encouraging it, producing a potentially significant economic
distortion.
35. Id. at 142–45.
36. Official Rules: 2.00 Definition of Terms, MLB.COM, http://mlb.mlb.
com/mlb/official_info/official_rules/definition_terms_2.jsp (last visited Jan. 26,
2015) (“OBSTRUCTION is the act of a fielder who, while not in possession of
the ball and not in the act of fielding the ball, impedes the progress of any
runner.”).
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CONTRACT MODIFICATION: NOT ENOUGH OF A
“SPECIAL CASE”
As I noted earlier, cases of contract modification are probably the most significant cases in which the notion of economic
duress arises.37 Nobody thinks a court would seriously deny
enforcement in the case of the forgone trees, but courts might
well deny enforcement of a contract modification in which one
party has threatened to breach in order to reallocate surplus in
his favor. On this topic, Seidenfeld and Mungan deserve significant praise; their argument is appropriately skeptical of the
formalistic rules of consideration, like the legal duty rule, that
are sometimes thought to govern this area, and it is sensitive to
many of the considerations that should matter in contractmodification cases.38
Their analysis, however, does not give appropriate weight
to the force and scope of the original contract subject to later
modification. Contract modification is one of the most difficult
problems in contract law, and it is not susceptible to a simple
solution that depends only on whether the party threatening
breach would benefit from breach. Clearly, the parties could
have explicitly allocated the risk of the events that led to the
threat of breach by contract; when they have not, the question
of implicit allocations of risk arises, just as it does in cases of
mistake and unexpected circumstances. A broad inquiry is
needed to determine where parties stand after their original
contract; simply asking whether one party would actually benefit from breach does not give effect to the parties’ intentions
under the original contract. To put it differently, Seidenfeld
and Mungan’s consideration of contract-modification cases runs
into the same general problem I discussed in Part II.B, supra:
in focusing on one short-run economic effect, it neglects broader
efficiencies at stake. In this case, what it neglects specifically
is the long-run efficiency from the prior contract.39 To be clear,
my argument is not that contract modifications should never be
permissible; in fact, I think they should ordinarily be permissible. But it is impossible to decide what is appropriately per37. See supra Part II.A.
38. See Seidenfeld & Mungan, supra note 1, at 45–50.
39. Cf. Varouj A. Aivazian et al., The Law of Contract Modifications: The
Uncertain Quest for a Bench Mark of Enforceability, 22 OSGOODE HALL L.J.
173, 175 (1984) (“[D]ynamic efficiency considerations focus on the long-run incentives for contracting parties at large imparted by a set of legal rules. In the
modification context, these dynamic efficiency considerations adopt an ex ante
perspective, rather than the ex post perspective implicit in the static efficiency
considerations.”).
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missible without considering the contracting context in which
the parties find themselves.
Consider Austin v. Loral.40 Austin, a subcontractor for Loral on a military contract, threatened to breach its contract to
supply parts to Loral for radar sets to be used by the US Navy.41 Austin claimed that as a result of sharply rising manufacturing costs, it was losing a significant amount of money on the
contract and that it could not afford these losses.42 As a result,
Austin stopped performing under the contract and insisted on
price increases under the original contract and the award of a
second contract on better terms.43 Loral agreed and made
payments; once Austin completed performance, it then sought
restitution of those payments, claiming duress.44
Seidenfeld and Mungan agree with the New York Court of
Appeal (New York’s high court), which found duress,45 rather
than the Appellate Division (the intermediate appellate court),
which did not.46 I agree broadly with Seidenfeld and Mungan
that the case should turn, at least partly, on whether (1) Austin
invented the threat of its breach merely to extract more value
from Loral or (2) Austin found itself in legitimate hardship and
offered Loral a way to help it avoid a mutually harmful
breach.47 This is a good starting point for the analysis. But I
would emphasize different facts from those that Seidenfeld and
Mungan emphasize. For example, it appears, under the RentSeeking Test, that they would preclude the possibility of duress
based on the threat of breach so long as Austin would benefit
more from breach than from performance. That is a perverse
result and threatens to undermine the original contract; it
would mean that any time the price moves against a party or
that party is otherwise in a worse situation from performing
than from breaching, that party could threaten to hold up performance on a contract without the possibility of their actions’
being judged wrongful. In its undermining of the force of contracts, such a result would be breathtakingly inefficient.
Consider, similarly, a hypothetical variation of Austin that
40.
41.
1970).
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

272 N.E.2d 533 (N.Y. 1971).
Austin Instrument Inc., v. Loral Corp, 316 N.Y.S.2d 528 (N.Y. App.
Id. at 530.
Id.
Id. at 531.
272 N.E.2d at 545.
316 N.Y.S.2d at 532–33.
Seidenfeld & Mungan, supra note 1, at 26–28.
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Seidenfeld and Mungan offer: suppose, “given the second contract, [Austin] can achieve economies of scale. Austin can then
make money by obtaining expensive but more sophisticated
equipment that would allow it to produce each part more quickly and cheaply.”48 In that case, Seidenfeld and Mungan would
find no duress. But this opportunity for Austin to benefit from
“economies of scale” from the second contract would, under the
Rent-Seeking Test, justify any attempt by Austin to extract
more value from threatening to breach, because Austin’s behavior would (because of the gain from the economies of scale) not
be solely redistributive. This returns us to the problem I identified at the end of Part II.B, supra: a small allocative gain does
not justify bad-faith action whose force is largely distributive.
Who knows what the relationship will be between Austin’s investment in this course of action and the total social gains from
it? Austin will be motivated to pursue this possibility simply if
its own gains are greater than its own costs. The “economies of
scale” from the second contract tell us very little about the efficiency of a modification or its consistency with the original contract’s allocation of risk.
Perhaps in recognition of this point, and in tension with
their earlier analysis of it, Seidenfeld and Mungan offer an exception to the Rent-Seeking Test in the case of contract modification. Their exception is apparently that the Rent-Seeking
Test should apply, but only after courts award specific performance instead of damages on all contracts.49 For several reasons, however, this is neither practical nor desirable. For one
thing, specific performance may be impossible in many of the
cases in which contract modification arises; for example, if Austin truly could not afford to perform the original contract, a decree of specific performance would not be helpful and would not
meaningfully change the analysis. Second, specific performance has significant potential costs that need to be weighed
against its benefits.50 It will not do to wave the problem of imperfect remedies away by assuming that courts have perfect
remedies at their disposal. Third, specific performance is not a
sufficient remedy to avoid the problems that Seidenfeld and
Mungan seek for it to avoid, because a suit for specific performance still requires the plaintiffs to incur potentially substan48. Id. at 27.
49. Id. at 50–51.
50. See generally Walgreen Co. v. Sara Creek Prop. Co., B.V., 966 F.2d
273 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.) (weighing the costs and benefits of specific performance versus expectation damages).
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tial transaction costs, and nothing prevents such costs from being significantly greater than those the defendants must incur
if they are sued. Fourth, Seidenfeld and Mungan assume that
the parties’ “initial agreement” contemplates specific performance rather than damages, but they give no reason for this
assumption.51
More to the point, however, courts do not already award
specific performance in all contracts cases. Perhaps they
should do so more often than they do; this would, among other
things, undercut most of the unpersuasive and severely problematic arguments that legal economists have made over the
years for a “theory of efficient breach,” the main force of which
is to weigh in against specific performance.52 It would be ironic
if inherent in Seidenfeld and Mungan’s argument were the
proposition that the theory of efficient breach must be incorrect
and specific performance must instead be universally available.
But to say that is just a rhetorical flourish; my main analytical
point is that, without universal adoption in courts of specific
enforcement, it is unclear where the Rent-Seeking Test stands
as a basis for evaluating contract modifications. Following the
logic of Seidenfeld and Mungan’s argument, it would be seem to
be entirely inapplicable—which would undermine their argument severely because, as I have previously noted, cases of contract modification are the principal cases in which economic
duress might be relevant.53
How should contract modifications be decided, then? I do
not believe there is any simple formula, even if the only goal is
to achieve efficiency. Relevant factors include (1) how much
circumstances have changed from the initial contract, because
modifications (or even just changes to allocations of the contractual surplus) contemplated and ruled out, implicitly or explicitly, by the original contract should not be enforced; and (2)
how much the threat of breach restricts the opportunities
available to the promisee. The first of these factors matters because of the allocation of risk under the parties’ specific contract; the second of these factors matters because of parties’
general tendencies—if they are fair-minded and rational—to
avoid hold-up problems.
51. Seidenfeld & Mungan, supra note 1, at 51.
52. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Actual and Virtual Specific Performance, the
Theory of Efficient Breach, and the Indifference Principle in Contract Law, 93
CALIF. L. REV. 975, 997–1014 (2005) (arguing against the “theory of efficient
breach”).
53. See supra Part II.A.
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The good faith of the promisor—the one threatening breach
and requesting a modification—also matters, but this must be
conceived more broadly than the Rent-Seeking Test would allow (because, again, the Rent-Seeking Test would endorse any
modification in which the party threatening breach would prefer breach to performance). Whether the promisor is attempting opportunistically to reallocate surplus, versus asking for a
fair modification, should influence the enforceability of a modification, for parties would probably desire for it to do so in the
general case—largely because it is broadly fair and efficient to
uphold good-faith reallocations.
CONTRACT NEGOTIATION: THE EXCEPTION THAT
SWALLOWS (AND UNDERMINES) THE RULE
Finally, an even more significant limitation that Seidenfeld
and Mungan impose on the Rent-Seeking Test—that it should
not apply to ordinary contract modification54—shows the problems with that test. The exception they propose also threatens
to swallow the rule, because there appears to be no principled
basis on which they can distinguish the cases in which the rule
applies from the cases in which the exception applies.
Their proposed exception to the Rent-Seeking Test looks
simple enough: the Rent-Seeking Test does not apply (to invalidate a contract) when a threat is merely to refuse to conclude a
contract, even if such a threat is otherwise “rent-seeking.” Specifically, their explicit exception is for “rent-seeking by threatening to walk away from contract negotiations, leaving the status quo ante.”55
This exception is necessary because the Rent-Seeking Test
threatens to invalidate many routine and desirable mechanisms for precommitment, including contract negotiations generally. The case that Seidenfeld and Mungan have in mind to
justify the exception for “threatening to walk away from contract negotiations” is relatively simple: a buyer offers $5 for a
book, and the seller refuses to sell at that price even though the
book is worth less than $5 to the seller.56 This refusal is “rentseeking,” under Seidenfeld and Mungan’s definition, because it
simply seeks more of the contractual surplus without any hope
of producing wealth.57 But it is clear that the refusal must be
54.
55.
56.
57.

Seidenfeld & Mungan, supra note 1, at 45–49.
Id. at 39.
Id.
Id. at 40–41.
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allowed; otherwise, anyone could force a contract simply by offering a price better than the other party’s reservation value.
For example, if I suspect that the lowest price at which a car
dealership would sell a car is $25,000, I could force the dealership to enter a contract with me by offering $25,000 to buy the
car, thereby preventing the dealership from negotiating with
me (or anyone else) further. Such further negotiations would
fail the unmodified Rent-Seeking Test.
This exception, however, relies on several arbitrary distinctions. Most importantly, an arbitrary reliance on the status
quo ante would restore a sort of distinction between acts and
omissions to a consequentialist analysis in which it has no
place. Seidenfeld and Mungan’s exception appears to depend
on the proposition that it is worse to destroy $500 in value than
to walk away from an opportunity to create $500. That is, Seidenfeld and Mungan are concerned about causing harm but not
about destroying a mere opportunity for gain. But those purporting to promote economic efficiency should be the first to
recognize that there is no principled distinction between those
two cases. To a rational, risk-neutral consequentialist, a forgone $500 opportunity is just as significant as $500 harm. The
status quo ante—in effect, the number 0—has no special place
in a consequentialist analysis, which is appropriately concerned
only with the greatest possible value going forward. Value ex
post, rather than ex ante, is the only driver of consequentialist
policy.58
Nonetheless, it is easy to see why Seidenfeld and Mungan
propose an exception for contract negotiations; without that exception, they would commit themselves to treating most ordinary contractual offers as rent-seeking and thus as cases of duress. After all, every offer is a potential threat, and it is a
typical goal in contract negotiations for a rational, selfinterested party to extract as much of the contractual surplus
as possible.
In addition to being arbitrary, the exception is also not
broad enough. Once the need to shield ordinary contract negotiations is recognized, it becomes clear that the simple case of
contract negotiations (or a distinction between destroying an
opportunity and destroying existing value) is not sufficient to
exhaust the appropriate exceptions to the Rent-Seeking Test.
Consider a slight variation to the example above involving the
58. Similarly, it would not be principled to distinguish threats to do nothing from threats to destroy value, because doing nothing may, depending on
context, destroy value.
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sale of a book: the owner of a book says to the buyer, “If you
don’t offer $12 right now, I’ll destroy the book.” In making this
threat, the seller is not threatening merely to “walk away” from
contract negotiations, nor is he threatening to restore the status quo ante—because if he carries through with the threat, the
status of the book will be changed irrevocably. Yet it would be
an extreme result if the seller were not able to destroy his own
book, or (more realistically) to use a threat of its destruction as
a precommitment device to indicate to the buyer the immutability of his own reservation price.59 And this analysis does not
depend on the book’s destruction; it would apply even if the
owner of the book merely had said, “If you don’t offer $12 right
now, I promise I will not negotiate with you in the future”—for
that would change the status quo ante by eliminating the possibility of potentially profitable negotiations. Likewise for “If
you don’t offer $12 right now, I will lock the book in a mechanical safe from which it cannot emerge for a year.”
Perhaps more importantly, a similar analysis applies to
many familiar mechanisms of contract negotiation, such as a
so-called first-price sealed-bid auction in which a party invites
competing bids and agrees to accept the best bid after a single
round of bidding, foreclosing all future negotiation.60 As to any
individual bidder, the auctioneer is not threatening to restore
the status quo ante; he is artificially threatening to foreclose all
opportunity of future negotiation even if such negotiation could
be productive ex post, and he is doing so merely in the hope of
extracting a greater surplus from the auction—not because going with the winner of the first round of bidding is productive
on its own. Clearly, the mere use of this popular auction mechanism won’t—and shouldn’t—amount to economic duress.61
59. Moreover, who is to say that the owner doesn’t enjoy—that is, derive
some subjective pleasure—from destroying books that he owns? How would a
court ever make the determination that the threat carried with it no benefit to
the seller? See supra Part II.A & II.B.
60. For a recent discussion of this and similar auction mechanisms in the
context of business sales, see Jay Kesten, Adjudicating Corporate Auctions, 23
YALE J. REG. (forthcoming 2015) (arguing that most such mechanisms should
be permitted on grounds of efficiency).
61. To elaborate somewhat, all cases where a party makes a precommitment are cases in which that party potentially destroys some value otherwise
available to him or her; that is the nature of precommitment, and surely some
precommitments are productive (or else contract law is worthless). The RentSeeking Test voids only those precommitments that, if carried through, will
subtract value from a party’s original position rather than fail to capture the
opportunities available to that party. But that distinction cannot matter from
the perspective of traditional wealth-maximization, because nothing in rational-actor economics distinguishes the waste of existing value from the waste of
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In short, it is arbitrary to single out the status quo ante as
a baseline against which changes are to be evaluated. It is not
a principled baseline for a consequentialist analysis. As a result, the exception for contractual negotiations is insufficient to
prevent a variety of routine and productive precommitment devices. If the exception were expanded, though, it would be hard
to know how to rule in a first-price sealed-bid auction but rule
out the case of the forgone trees.
CONCLUSION
Duress is both more and less than rent-seeking. The RentSeeking Test that Seidenfeld and Mungan propose could never
be applied, has limited relevance in the most significant cases
to which it might apply (those of contract modification), neglects the longer-term efficiencies of both contract law and
property law, and requires exceptions that undermine most of
its force.
The limitations of Seidenfeld and Mungan’s arguments
show, perhaps, a problem with their underlying endeavor. It is
helpful, as a matter of pure theoretical microeconomic arguments, to isolate economic effects and to derive conclusions
about them. Short-run efficiencies of transactions, evaluated in
a context-free manner, are theoretically interesting. But as arguments about the law—even if they were presented as partial,
incomplete solutions to legal problems—abstract economic
analyses often fall short because of concerns about administrability and because they neglect broader efficiencies that incorporate dynamic considerations, context, and long-run effects.
These problems are different from those that typical critiques
of legal-economic arguments identify; for example, only in passing in this Essay have I made reference to the fact that parties
are not fully rational or informed. They reflect problems with
the inner logic of many modern legal-economic arguments: in
short, they do not in fact produce efficient results.

an opportunity.

